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The author addresses ways in which participants in the religion-and-science dialogues avoid
ethically setmtive issues involving the scientifically developed subject of nonhuman animals.
Using the concept of ethical anthropocentrism, he maintains that the contemporary dialogue is
mired in a traditional set of concepts and myopic discourse. The present approach entails seri-
ous risks of weakening both religious life and scientific inquiry, including the foundation for an
engagement between religion and science. Furthermore, the specific sciences dealing with non-
human animals should be engaged fully for a niunber of reasons related to both religious and
scientific goals. Afather benefit ofsuch an engagement would be promotion ofan understanding
of community more responsive to the non-anthropocentric ethics found so broadly in religious
traditions outside the Abrahamic, and in subordinated portions of the Abrahamic traditions.
One of the more humbling features of hu-
man history is the fact that many of the most
prized and able thinkers, and indeed at times
the entire academy, have avoided and some-
times even denied altogether certain ethical
issues, because these subjects have been in-
convenient, unpopular, or uncomfortable.
Well-known examples include Aristotle's ra-
tionalization of slavery,' the failure of liber-
als in the eighteenth and nineteenth century
to include women and people of color in pro-
posed expansions of the vote and other po-
litical power,' and the all-too-easy accommo-
dation of established religious institutions to
a panoply of exclusivisms, including racism,
patriarchy, classism, and homophobia.^
With this history in mind, I consider here
whether something like this is occurring in
Christianity's dialogue with the Western sci-
entific tradition on the subject of the animals
outside the humans species. More specifi-
cally, I want to engage certain features of the
current dialogue as carried out by prominent
theologians and scientists, and I will suggest
that problems of avoidance and myopia do
exist in the current engagement of "theology"
and "science" on the issue of "animals.""*
What prompts these questions is a baffling
phenomenon—the religion-and-science dia-
logue seems historically to have been domi-
nated by ( 1 ) an engagement between theolo-
gians and physicists, in particular cosmolo-
gists, and (2) a very limited engagement with
only some of the implications of Darwin's
ideas. As to the latter, even though Darwin's
ideas deal with the human species' relation-
ships to all other animals, those theologians
who have engaged Darwin seem to have fo-
cused on the implications of his work for the
design argument or for sociobiology, as well
as some of the aggressive claims made in the
1970s by atheistic, scientistic biologists like
Jacques Monod and Richard Dawkins."* If one
tries to find theological circles where there
has been a serious engagement with the more
specific biological sciences that have grown
out of the Darwinian revolution, especially
those that provide highly specific information
about the most complex nonhuman animals,
one finds few, if any.
The answer to the question of why theolo-
gians have concentrated on physics and cos-
mology, but not on those biological sciences
working to discover the realities of nonhuman
animals, is not obvious; nor is this a topic about
which one can easily generalize. One can say,
however, that the trend continues. I take this
trend to be the result of a pervasive and influ-
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ential bias that begs the question, why is there
no sustained attempt to dialogue with those
portions of tlie scientific tradition that include
the very specific and well-developed biologi-
cal sciences in which astonishingly diverse
information regarding other animals can be
found?
The phenomenon presents some fascinat-
ing problems from the vantage point of both
ethics and an understanding of religion in the
lives of human beings. In this paper, I frame
questions in ways that seek to open up minds
on this issue. They are not meant to impugn
in any way the motives or character of those
involved in the cunent dialogue, for I read
the engagement of religion with science as not
only one of elegant and imaginative encoun-
ters, but also one of laudable intentions. But
even if my reading of the intentions is cor-
rect, such intentions have not prevented the
theologian's engagement with the scientific
tradition from being subject to "conditioned
ethical blindness"—that is, good intentions
have not prevented the theologian from be-
coming so accustomed to a piirticular way of
thinking, as to be conditioned not to see its
effects or larger implications.''
Invitation in the form of four
questions
To probe the reasons why this engagement
has not taken place, or if it has, why it re-
mains unknown and of little, if any, impor-
tance in established theological circles, I pose
four specific questions. These are, I suggest,
an invitation to engage the spirit of today's
faith-and-science exchanges. As a practical
matter, these questions force one to stay in
touch with the fundamental features of the
overall projects of, respectively, the scientific
and the religious traditions.
1. Looking at the scholarship and discourse
in the field of "religion and science," which
parts of science, on the one hand, and of reli-
gion, on the other, are being fully engaged?
2. Is it possible that there has been a dis-
proportionate emphasis on some sciences and
on certain views of religion, such that the re-
sults risk being unscientific and perhaps some-
what un-religious (in the sense of being too
narrowly and, thus, perhaps misleadingly
mired in only one dimension of religious con-
cern)?
3. Does the present state of the science-
and-religion dialogue betray a traditional
anthropocentrism?
4. Does the current state of the dialogue
betray a kind of imperialism as well, focusing
on only Western concepts of who and what
matter in reality, which beings constitute "per-
sons," and which animals, human or otherwise,
have ethically significant complexities, such
as culture, intelligence, or emotional depth?
I venture some preliminary answers to
these questions, and along the way suggest that
a debilitating narrowness and short-
sightedness are involved in the problems I
address. If this is true, engaging these prob-
lems may well help to uncover some interest-
ing complications tlowing from the current
form of the religion-and-science dialogue.
These complications include the following
potential problems.
(a) Scholars' choices may make them
complicit in the broader society's failure to
grapple with certain inherently ethical themes.
(b) Scholars' choices may minimize op-
portunities for disseminating information of
an eminently scientific nature that can be of
the greatest relevance to the most fundamen-
tal values of religious traditions.
(c) Scholars' choices may result in a fail-
ure to listen to certain other dialogues, which
failure can have an imperialist cast. For ex-
ample, discussions of the status of nonhuman
animals have long gone on, and certainly now
occur, even if, in societies that draw their in-
tellectual sustenance from the European in-
tellectual tradition, such discussions have been
relegated by the theological tradition to "non-
establishment" circles.
(d) Scholars' choices may keep religious
traditions in the complicated position of pur-
porting to opine on the status of other, nonhu-
man lives. When such opinions continue to
be held, even in the face of available and con-
trary information, the nature of religious
affirmations or dismissals of nonhuman life
must be assessed.
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Beyond the generalities of sci-
ence: engaging the specific
realities of living beings
The issue I am pursuing can be framed by
focusing on the specific and difficult set of
issues that fall under the theme "religion and
animals" (or, using science-based temiinol-
ogy, "religion and nonhuman animals'").
Broadly speaking, at least the following
themes fall under the religion and animals
rubric: (1) learning to see the role of, and
work done by, the images of nonhuman ani-
mals found so broadly in religious symbol-
ism; (2) assessing how religious traditions
have treated or otherwise engaged nonhuman
animals, such as through the promotion or pre-
vention of obvious harms to them; and (3)
identifying the general role that religious tra-
ditions have had as mediators of views of
nonhuman animals. In a colloquial manner,
one might ask, "Have religions gotten it right
or wrong regarding other, that is, nonhuman,
animals?"
Regarding this general area, a review of
the contemporary discussion between "reli-
gion" and "science" suggests three things:
firstly, that something like a general tendency
to avoid these topics, ||
particularly the ethi-
cally charged issues,
characterizes the
work of those contem-
porary scholars now
at work in the reli-
gion-and-science dia-
logue; secondly, that
such avoidance oc-
curs in spite of other-
wise laudable inten-
tions; and, finally, that
one can learn from
this recurring ten-
dency something
about the place of ethics in individual lives.
So let me again state the general question,
although this time in a more specific form:
Does the failure to engage nonhuman animals,
particularly as it is reflected in the scholar-
ship and discourse of those in the academy
who now promote the religion-and-science
dialogue, betray a traditional anthropo-
centrism that is in some ways both unscien-
tific and unreligious?
Given that even a little research shows
easily that the importance of nonhuman indi-
viduals is not a new theme (it is both an an-
cient concern and one still central in indig-
enous cosmologies), the conclusions of this
article suggest that ( 1 ) there is in the Western
academy currently a profound failure to deal
with this subject, (2) this failure is the prod-
uct of a continuing, and debilitating,
anthropocentrism in ethical reflection, (3) this
failure is part of a tendency to assume that
mainline ethical reflection is the whole of ethi-
cal reflection, rather than merely one of the
many historically and culturally conditioned
options available, and (4) a failure to change
this tendency will perpetuate exclusivist val-
ues that now imbalance the living and think-
ing of humankind.
Ethical questions: central and
daily
Posing inquiries about other animals in a
forum where religion is discussed is a deli-
cate matter: it uncovers certain extremely con-
tentious issues about the nature ofhuman ethi-
Westeni theological tradition hasfound
many ways to ignore the conclusion that
human moral abilities beg the question
about other animals. In the religion-and-
science dialogue, theologians characteristi-
cally concern themselves with those sciences
that allow them to avoid the inherently ethi-
cal questions that many life sciences thrust
on the eating and informed moral agent.
cal abilities, and it reveals some important dif-
ferences between and among religious tradi-
tions. The ethical questions are inevitable,
because all human cultural traditions that are
explicitly religious foreground a claim that
this life is a deeply moral matter.'' Yet, de-
spite a consensus that human beings have spe-
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cial abilities to care about others, religious tra-
ditions differ in startling ways over the iden-
tities of such "others" and, in particular, over
the significance of nonhuman animals. Such
differences betray a profound disagreement
over the most basic features of human moral
abilities. For example, only some fonns of
religious life make the question of nonhuman
animals an ethical question of the first order.
The Buddhist and Jain traditions' first precept,
recited daily by millions, is a moral undertak-
ing that commits believers to avoid killing
(which is, of course, paralleled by the Hindu
traditions' commitment to ahimsa). The af-
firmation of nonhuman lives implicit in this
ethical precept stands in stark contrast to cer-
tain claims found broadly in the Abrahamic
traditions. An example, though one by no
means fully representative of each and every
aspect of these complex of traditions, is set
forth in the Roman Catholic Church's recently
revised Catechism:
Animals, like plants and inanimate
things, are by nature destined for the
common good of past, present and
lulure humanity.'*
The differences in these two approaches pro-
vide interesting material for those who wish
to argue that, in ethical matters, the Abrahamic
traditions are more anthropocentric than, say,
the traditions of the Indian subcontinent.''
The special abilities to care about others
exhibited by humans lead each person, as an
individual, to an inevitable set of foundational
ethical questions that manifest themselves
regularly in our daily lives: "Who are the
others about whom we can care? And who
are the others about whom we should care?"
These questions are existentially relevant,
perhaps natural,'" and clearly of central im-
portance to any religious tradition.
Answers to these questions have by no
means been static across time. Both within
and without religious traditions, there has been
an expanding circle of protection." At
present, there are developments that suggest
the expansion continues, such that traditional
answers within the Western cultural sphere to
these core ethical questions are still being re-
vised in, among other places, legal systems.''
In particular, "religion and ecology" dis-
cussions increasingly engage these founda-
tional "who are the others?" questions in vi-
brant ways.'' This dialogue is characterized
by non-anthropocentric perspectives that are
far broader than the tradition-burdened, hu-
man-centered responses that comprise virtu-
ally all theologically based ethics in the West-
ern cultural tradition. Yet, even in this ex-
traordinary new development, there remain
subtle ways in which the dialogue obscures
"animals" as an ethical issue. '^ As discussed
below with regard to the work of several theo-
logians and scientists who participate in the
current religion-and-science dialogue, present
conceptual schemes (such as the trilogy, God
and humans and nature) may be counterpro-
ductive for the important puipose of address-
ing the current marginalization of nonhuman
lives. Nonetheless, the inclusivist spirit and
concepts of the new religion-and-ecology in-
quiry, along with that of interfaith dialogue
and social justice movements, push one to put
analogous challenges to the contemporary
dialogue between religion and science: Who
are the recognized "others"? Which sciences
are part of the engagement? Do exclusivist
notions handed down blindly as "tradition"
still hold undue control? Are theologians
»
handicapped by, and can they get beyond, tra-
ditional exclusions and narrow discourse? Or
does the dialogue energize and open minds,
thereby pushing participants to think in
inclusivist and broader perspectives?
I suggest below that the religion-and-sci-
ence dialogue remains mired in a self-imposed
predicament, and that this shuation is clearly
a matter of choice. Tragically, such a choice,
to the extent that it continues to allow a self-
serving, self-affirming, and selfish anthropo-
centrism to prevail, entails serious risks that
threaten the integrity of the dialogue. Indeed,
failure to acknowledge these risks is likely to
undermine the growth of otherwise laudable
efforts to engage the intersection of scientific
and religious concerns.
Religion and which sciences?
One way to assess whether the current
religion-and-science discussion is stuck in a
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narrow place is to ask which sciences are most
typically engaged in dialogue by theologians,
religious leaders, or believers. Consider first
that anyone's engagement with science always
entails an engagement with scientists who
practice a specific discipline. It is often as-
sumed that the word "science" does helpful
work in descriptions of various problems.
With only a little retlection, however, it be-
comes clear that the term "science" is at times
employed carelessly and in a way that sug-
gests that the focus and practice of science is
monolithic. Such a claim, whether explicit
or implicit, is misleading in the extreme.
Consider a list of some of our contempo-
rary sciences: animal behavior, aquaculture,
biochemistry, biotechnology, cetology, cog-
nitive sciences, comparative developmental
evolutionary psychology, conservation biol-
ogy, developmental biology, ecology,
ecotoxicology, entomology, environmental
sciences, ethology, evolutionary sciences,
fisheries, genetics, forestry, horticulture, ma-
rine mammal studies, microbiology, molecu-
lar and cell biol(>1:y, neuroscience, nutrition,
organismal biology, palaeontology,
paleobiology, parasitology, pharmacology,
physiology, plant biology, population biology,
population genetics, primatology, psychology,
systematics, toxicology, zoology. What is
noteworthy about this list, which is hardly
complete, is that it is composed primarily of
the proliferating life sciences, and ignores oft-
cited items such as physics, chemistry, as-
tronomy, and mathematics.
Ask science-and-religion dialoguers
which of these life sciences are their partners.
The most inclusivist answer would likely in-
clude ecology, environmental sciences, evo-
lutionary sciences, and psychology. Few, if
any, have a deep engagement with those sci-
ences that have developed the most advanced
infomiation regarding the most complex ani-
mals outside the human species.'"^
In casting about for answers to why one
sees within the religion-and-science dialogue
only certain sciences and not others, one in-
evitably stumbles across the fact that, in our
current culture, not all sciences are created
equal. In other words, some sciences are given
much more respect than are others. Recall
the famous quip by Ernest Rutherford, who
said that science is best understood by break-
ing it up into two fields, "physics and stamp-
collecting.""' Physics now occupies the posi-
tion once occupied by theology as the "queen
of the sciences." This is, no doubt, related to
the great success of physics and other physi-
cal sciences in discovery ofsome foundational
features of physical reality, the universe gen-
erally, and especially cosmic origins. It is also
related to the fact that the findings of the
physical sciences have "delivered," in the
sense of being a foundation for those tech-
nologies and industries that supply products
for a consumer-oriented society.
The success and prestige of certain sci-
ences, such as physics and chemistry, have
dramatically affected the methods and goals
of scientists in other fields. A prime example
is the aspiration of psychology's behaviorist
camp in the twentieth century to offer expla-
nations more like those of physics and chem-
istry.'^ And. as evidenced by the discussion
between theologians and cosmologists, phys-
ics is the science that has caught the fancy of
many in the religion-and-science dialogue.
It is, however, worth pausing to consider
further why physics, rather some of the life
sciences listed above, is the science that has,
in the main, engaged theologians. The elegant
answers to the profoundly interesting ques-
tions of physics, or alternatively those of
chemistry or mathematics or astronomy, have
almost no purchase on the fundamental, exis-
tentially pressing features of our world, issues
purportedly engaged by theology. Said in an-
other way, physics, even if it deals in a lim-
ited sense with the most basic aspects of hu-
man micro- and macro-universes, as it were,
has absolutely nothing to with the complexi-
ties of handling features of daily life. Given
that religion, if it can be said to be "about"
anything, is about daily life, there is at least
some irony when a theologian or church leader
gives so much reflective energy and time to
heavily quantified physical sciences about is-
sues that, in an existential sense, impact hu-
man beings very little in their immediate, in-
tensely ethical lives.
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Further, a preoccupation by theologians
with the physics of the origin of the universe
is, when it perpetuates ignorance about more
immediate surroundings (that is, other Hving
beings impacted by human activity), is po-
tentially tragic. Each religious tradition has
its own way of handling the fact that the reli-
gious life is about existential and immediate
matters, rather than about speculative guesses,
informed or otherwise, regarding the overall
and most basic structure of the universe. Bud-
dhists, for example, have the TenAvydkatdiii,
translated variously as "the indeterminates or
points not determined [by the Buddha while
alive]" or "questions which tend not to edifi-
The anomaly returns to the fore, of
Abrahamic theological traditions failing
radically to engage the claim that human
beingSy as moral agents, ought to know
about nonhuman animals and then ac-
cord them fundamental protections y such
asfreedom from captivity or other instru-
mental uses.
cation." Indeed, the tendency to wander in
soteriological irrelevancies is a hallmark of
some theology, such that some people of faith
repudiate it as useless.
If religion is primarily about the immedi-
ate realities of believers' lives and their need
to discern moral norms and then act in moral
ways, one might expect that it would be those
scientific disciplines exercising the basic hu-
mility of patient observation that captured
theologiiuis' imagination. It is, after all, within
the observable, nearby surroundings of one's
local world, as it were, that one must act and
judge the consequences of one's finite, daily
choices. Said in theological terms, it is in
one's own limited world that one must find
God's presence. In less theological but still
explicitly moral terms, religion and its essen-
tially ethical messages about love, compas-
sion, kindness to others, etc., are lived out on
a local, daily level, not at the level that phys-
ics, chemistry, astronomy, and mathematics
engage.
Perhaps the allure of opining on the most
basic physical features of the cosmos, includ-
ing its origin in the remote past, explains the
disdainful attitude of some scientists to the
"stamp-collecting" work of other scientists,
such as ethologists, who patiently, humbly,
and honestly describe the realities of nonhu-
man animals and the surrounding ecosystems.
Primatologists, marine mammalogists, and
specialists in elephant behavior, for example,
do not call upon complex equations. Big
Bangs, and subatomic particles to explain the
>,; day-to-day lives of the
complex animals they
study. Such work is, how-
ever, crucial in the present
environment, given the
radical ignorance both
within and without the sci-
ences regarding the social,
emotional, and intellectual
lives of the most complex
of nonhuman animals."*
Further, such painstaking
and detailed research re-
quires great discipline in
order to resist applying traditional stereotypes
to the animals being studied. In this sense,
this kind of work represents well the humil-
ity-spawning features of scientific method.
Dismantling stereotypes of other animals,
because they have been underdetermined by
day-to-day realities and overdetermined by ig-
norance-driven bias, is crucial for another, emi-
nently ethical reason. Caricatures of other ani-
mals remain powerful images both inside and
outside the scientific tradition. Scientists who
get beyond caricature and stereotype regard-
ing the daily lives of nonhuman animals may
do work that seems humble relative to the
macro-level work of astrophysicists. This work
is, nevertheless, of crucial importance to the
ability of a moral agent to see the world in an
informed way. Hence, any responsible moral
agent desperately needs such detailed infor-
mation to understand the impact of human
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actions on previously unknown realities, such
as the complexities of nonhunian animals.'*^
Religion, tlieologians, and humility
While religious traditions have much to
say about the need for basic humility, a cer-
tain kind of humility seems to be lacking in
those who, despite unfamiliarity with the ac-
tual realities of nonhunian animals, nonethe-
less attempt to offer opinions relevant to the
significance of any and all nonhunian animals.
Do some major participants in the religion-
and-science dialogue miss entirely the rel-
evance of those sciences dealing with the re-
alities of other animals that are either near
human communities or far away from them?
Might these be of relevance to the core fea-
tures of any ethical tradition and, as such, re-
ligious traditions generally?
Relatedly, why would someone who
wishes to say something about the relation-
ship between religion and science focus only
on, say, physics and its related sciences? One
explanation for such a preoccupation might
be that physics in the twentieth century was,
in an important political and ethical sense,
easy to engage. Engaging twentieth-century
questions about the origin of the universe, for
example, did not require much speculation
about the oppressions that are an integral part
of the daily struggles of many people. Some-
one can be deeply interested in, say, astrophys-
ics or subatomic physics, without ever con-
templating the harsh realities just outside the
door, realities that provoke some moral agents
to be deeply committed to a revolution in cul-
tural, political, and economic values. In fact,
if one wanted to maintain the status quo, in-
cluding present oppressions, one could study
physics all day and not in any way affect the
patriarchy, classism, racism, or other oppres-
sions of contemporary societies.
What is religion about, though, if it is not
about day-to-day choices? If one were look-
ing for a religion-and-science dialogue that
avoids engagement with the daily world, the
dialogue of religion with modem physics would
probably be the best choice. Simply said, the
contemporary engagement of theology with
physics has far fewer consequences than would.
say, a full engagement with social justice con-
cerns or certain biological sciences, such as
the heavily publicized work in primatology
and marine mammalogy, or the less prominent
work in elephant studies. Is it mere happen-
stance that few theologians or scholars of re-
ligion can tell an African elephant from an In-
dian one, or a great ape from a lesser one? Or
that few religious leaders care to know either
that chimpanzee and bonobo great apes share
more than 99% of their active DNA with hu-
man great apes, or that humans have been re-
ferred to as "the third chimpanzee"?-" This
kind of scientific data is ignored, even as there
are, literally, hundreds of theological contexts
where great attention is paid to the Big Bang,
quantum theory, and the Anthropic Principle.
Ethics and the local world
Like religious faith, what is ethics about
if not one's own neighborhood? What one be-
lieves deeply is reflected far more fully in how
one acts than in what one says of one's ac-
tions. Gandhi once framed this wisdom in a
very simple form by saying, "The act will
speiik unerringly."-' This aphorism about what
in life discloses a person's true beliefs frames
a pailicularly important challenge for religious
traditions on any issue, including the daily
challenges faced by Christian and other reli-
gious believers regiuding "who the others are."
Might nonhunian animals be "others"
about which human moral agents are con-
cerned, and towards which harmful actions
should not be directed, for the same or simi-
lar reasons why human individuals should not
be harmed? Note what this question entails:
namely, discerning whether the nonhunian
individuals near the agent can and should be
protected. As noted above, nonhuman indi-
viduals have indeed been recognized as wor-
thy of protection in some religious traditions,
though it is commonly said that the Abrahamic
traditions are, ethically speaking, anthropo-
centric.-- What are the practical implications
of such ethical anthropocentrism? The im-
plications are, it turns out, rather stark.
Generally, any ethical principle, whether
religiously framed or not, must be related to
the things that an individual is able to do in
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ordinary life. As philosophers say, "ought
impHes can." Thus, if I say, "you ought to do
this," I have implied that you can do it. That,
of course, involves talking realistically about
your actual situation in the world. What can
people do in their ordinary, ethically-charged
lives, given the actual choices confronting
them as agents capable of morality?
Religious ethics, though, sometimes ex-
hibit an interest in the inverse, namely, that
"can implies ought." Of course, this does not
automatically apply to a wide range of situa-
tions, for just because one can do something,
it does not follow that one is obliged to. But
religious traditions often suggest that we ought
to act just because we can, and particularly so
when the context is morally charged. For ex-
ample, if I can give funds to charity, ought I?
In the matter of nonhuman animals, the paral-
lel question is, if I can care about these others,
ought I? hi the aliinisa-dnvcn traditions of
the Indian subcontinent, the answer to the sec-
ond question is "Yes," at least with regard to
preserving other animals' lives. -^ Sometimes,
then, in view of human moral capabilities,
some religious traditions suggest that, with
regard to nonhuman animals, the capacity to
act alternatively creates an obligation not to
kill them. Relying on a foundation of the spe-
cial qualities of human abilities to care about
others, the religious ethics of these traditions
thus exemplify an inversion of the common
philosophical adage, moving from "ought
implies can" to "can implies ought."
Why nonhuman individuals are
relevant to theology and ethics
Note that the claim here is that other ani-
mals matter as individuals, because it is in this
capacity that they have particular relevance
to human beings as moral agents. Why? Be-
cause individual moral agents can treat indi-
vidual animals well. In fact, duties to indi-
viduals contrast nicely with moral duties to
larger realities such as an entire species, an
ecosystem, and the earth. Though of great
importance, treating these larger realities
"well" is made especially difficult by their size,
complexity, and the very generality of the un-
derlying concents. Individuals, on the other
hand, are situated differently, existing at the
more "local" level of immediate and daily liv-
ing. Here, they can be seen and understood,
as can the direct and indirect effects of human
choices and actions upon them. When spe-
cific inquiry is made in this way, it is easy to
recognize identifiable impacts that human ac-
tions have on individuals, human or otherwise.
As such, these consequences are comprehen-
sible, whereas the impact of human actions
on "the environment" or on the human
econiche, or even on a species as a whole, is
typically much harder to discern. If I run over
or poison an animal, it is that individual who
dies, not the species. If I buy a product that
was a living animal, it is easily comprehended
that the product is more than a resource that I
can consume without ethically-charged con-
sequences. A specific individual with feelings
and a life was impacted because of my con-
sumption. It is, then, simply easier to recog-
nize how to treat an individual animal well, or
to refrain from harming it, than it is to recog-
nize how to treat the environment or a species
or the earth well.
This practical aspect of engaging individu-
als, as opposed to the not-so-easily discerned
impacts on supra-individual realities, is one
feature that suits human beings to inquire
about other individuals. By training children,
for example, to see such impacts, parents de-
velop their abilities as moral agents, helping
them take responsibility for their own acts,
one of the hallmarks of any moral system.
Considering the impact of their acts on other
individuals, human or otherwise, provides all
persons with a very personal way of deciding
how they can and will, through their individual
decisions, live out a moral vision.
Hence, another peculiarity of theology fail-
ing to engage precisely those sciences that tell
the most about the lives of others is the missed
opportunities that such a failure produces. If
religious believers fail to recognize this im-
portant dimension that other individuals (again,
human or otherwise) bring them with regard
to their moral abilities, they may well not de-
velop a full awareness, a comprehensive sense
of responsibility, and related virtues that are
preconditions to a developed moral sense.
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What is peculiar is that the Western theo-
logical tradition has found many ways to ig-
nore the conclusion that human moral abili-
ties beg the question about other animals. One
manifestation of this avoidance seems to be
that, in the religion-and-science dialogue,
theologians characteristically concern them-
selves with those sciences that allow them
to avoid the inherently ethical questions that
The realm ofnonhuman animals is so
internally diverse that to resort to the
unqualified categories ^^nature'* or ^Hhe
world*' to describe the many realities
and activities ofnonhuman animals is
positively misleading.
many life sciences thrust on the caring and
infotined moral agent. Is this individual in
front of me, even though nonhuman, such that
my moral sensibilities apply? Since many
sciences have shown that other large-brained
social animals, such as chimpanzees, oran-
gutans, bonobos, gorillas, elephants, and
whales and dolphins, are extraordinary indi-
viduals with intelligence of many kinds, emo-
tional complexities, social realities, personal
loyalties, even cultures—and certainly the ca-
pacity to suffer in mental and physical
ways—a close encounter with these sciences
would inevitably prompt an ethical inquiry.
Do the realities of any other animals' lives
bear on one's religious life or on one's obli-
gation to be a moral being? Clearly, the lives
of many nonhuman animals' lives can be pro-
tected. Ought they be? Ought the religion-
and-science dialogue engage carefully the
sciences that bear on this eminently ethical
issue?'^
What is anomalous about Western theol-
ogy as a whole, aside from these obvious ques-
tions, is that Western theologians have staked
out human moral abilities as their prime terri-
tory, because theologians of all stripes have
been heavily invested in the claim that human
beings are capable moral agents. So, the
anomaly returns to the fore, ofAbrahamic theo-
logical traditions failing radically to engage the
claim that humans, as eminently moral beings,
ought to know about nonhuman animals and,
upon knowing about them, then accord them
fundamental protections, such as freedom from
captivity or other instrumental uses.
Note, too, that personal experience shows,
generally, that many individuals, human and
otherwise, often care about other nonhuman
animals.-' Why have most
Western theological traditions
marginalized such experi-
ences, especially given the
commitments of theology to
human ethical abilities? One
way to ascertain whether any
nonhuman animals are legiti-
mate moral patients (by
^- which 1 mean that they are to
be protected by moral agents
on the issue of the fundamentals, such as life
and the integrity of their familial and social
bonds) would be to inquire into the research
findings of the sciences that deal with specifi-
cally nonhuman animals' lives.
The analysis below suggests that, on the
whole, the engagement between theologians
and the most relevant life sciences remains at
best at an undeveloped level, and, hence, un-
satisfactory. The consequence of this is that
theologians' resuUing analyses all too often
perpetuate ignorance, because those analyses
are caricature-driven.
Some theologians
One way to investigate whether the reli-
gion-and-science dialogue is plagued by the
risks I describe is to engage a range of dia-
logue participants who have dealt with the
intersection of religion and science. Here I
suggest that because certain relevant short-
comings appear in the work of prominent
spokespersons involved in the modern dia-
logue between Christianity and the Western
scientific tradition, myopic approaches end
up dominating the perspectives taken in that
dialogue. Both of these problems promote
risks that are oddly in tension with the over-
all projects of, respectively, religion and sci-
ence.
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Wolfhart Pannenberg
I begin with Wolthart Pannenberg, and
take examples from two of his works. The
first is Anthropology in Theological Perspec-
tive, Pannenberg 's 1985 attempt to wrestle
with the theological implications of certain
sciences, including biology. The second work
is Pannenberg's 1993 work. Toward a Theol-
ogy ofNature: Essays on Science and Faith.
Both books reflect this influential theologian's
commitment ciirefully to engage non-theologi-
cal disciplines, a commitment that pushes
Pannenberg to talk about nonhuman animals
at certain strategic points.
Consider this example from the earlier work.
After opening the book with a chapter entitled
"The Uniqueness of Humanity," Pannenberg, as
part of his discussion of Herder's and Scheler's
thought, says, "animals... live wholly in the
present moment, ignorant of both future and
past."-*' This claim about nonhuman animals'
lack of a sense of time seems to be a factual
assertion, given that Pannenberg cites as sup-
port two scientific works from 1937 and 1958.-^
But as evidenced by references that he cites later
in the book,-** Pannenberg plainly knew of other
scientific work that strongly suggested that the
cognitive levels of some nonhuman animals (he
concentrates most fully on chimpanzees) are
such that they do have a sense of future and past,
and are, thus, far more cognitively complex than
implied by Pannenberg's dismissive generali-
zation.
More interesting than this misstatement,
however, is the fact that Pannenberg was, at
that time, clearly aware of the growing body
of knowledge regarding the more complex
nonhuman animals. Hence, given that he
chose to present only evidence supportive of
his statement, while ignoring counterfactual
evidence, one is tempted to conclude that this
otherwise remarkable thinker was, in this work
at least, not concerned about his perpetuation
of a stereotype of nonhuman animals.
The history of this dismissive stereotype
is as long as it is intellectually bankrupt. It
has been a prominent feature of philosophers'
and theologians' uninformed dismissal of the
complexities of nonhuman animals since an-
cient Greek times.-'' Through use of a carica-
ture underdetemiined by the factual realities
of the animals he dismisses, Pannenberg stands
in the long line of those who have chosen se-
lectively from available images of nonhuman
animals, in order to confinn a preexisting bias.
In Pannenberg's case, the bias takes the form
of the proposition that only human beings are
complex enough to deserve fundamental moral
protections. This is a claim that Christianity's
mainline theological tradition has long under-
written, even though it is not in any way es-
sential to soteriological discourse.
There are substantial risks in Pannenberg's
approach, however, the most obvious of which
is that such a wide-ranging dismissal of all
nonhuman animals will be contradicted by
simple empirical data. Another risk is the
charge that the selection of evidence is driven
by a pre-existing agenda. Pannenberg's se-
lectivity regarding evidence begs the question
of whether his pre-existing agenda is the main-
line Christian theological tradition's
longstanding bias for humans. When this or
any other bias replaces a humble exploration
of the realities of other animals, to which well-
executed scientific methods ideally lead, the
resulting claims may well distort the described
realities.^" Worse one risks the perpetuation
of stereotypes and caricatures.
Consider how Pannenberg does this re-
garding chimpanzees, closest evolutionary
cousins to human beings.^' He contrasts them
with human beings, who
have past and future... because unlike
the animals [that is, any and all
nonhuman animals], including even the
chimpanzees, they are able 'to loosen
the bonds imposed by the situation and
to distance themselves from it.' "
As noted above, when Pannenberg made
these claims in 1985, much attention was
being given to Goodall's work that showed
in many ways that existing perspectives in
science regarding chimpanzees were radi-
cally inaccurate and inadequate. ^^ Addition-
ally, the work of Gallup and others regard-
ing the high level cognitive skills and self-
awareness of some nonhuman animals had
been available for more than a decade and a
half.^'* Given the mainline Christian theo-
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logical tradition's refusal to countenance non-
human animals generally, Pannenberg's im-
plicit acceptance of the traditional derogation
of all nonhuman animals is not surprising.
What is troubling, however, is Pannenberg's
desire to opine about all nonhuman animals,
even when neither science nor the theologi-
cal tradition had explored many of the more
complicated animals in any detail.
Surprising discoveries continue to pour in,
such as humpback whales' complex "songs,"'*''
elephants' heavy use of subsonic communi-
cations, and bottlenose dolphins' self-awiire-
ness.^** At the very least, such reports and, in
particular, the pace of new "discoveries" sug-
gest that present perspectives, and surely tra-
ditional perspectives, are subject to radical
questioning, and that conservative use of dis-
missive generalizations is in order.
One result of Pannenberg's acquiescence
in traditional theological dismissals of any and
all nonhuman animals is his uncritical use of
the traditional vocabulary regarding nonhu-
man animals generally. This vocabulary has
been dismissive, dualistic, and correspond-
ingly unresponsive. When engaging science,
a tradition that counts humans as animals,
Pannenberg consistently uses the word "ani-
mals" to mean "all non-
human animals." This
habit and others, such as
his use of tenns such as
"lower animals," sug-
gest that Pannenberg
was, from the beginning
of his project, predis-
posed to accept data
from the scientific tradi-
tion that confirm his '
theological bent, but not to acknowledge or
search out counter-factual evidence or to ex-
plore the implications of ongoing change and
discovery.
The same pattern appears in his 1993
work, Toward a Theology ofNature, although
now the discourse is enriched primarily by
Pannenberg's desire to work with terms and
concepts that are prominent in the develop-
ing Western ecological tradition. In this
shorter work, as in the longer, Pannenberg
never engages detailed studies of any actual
animal groups, despite an obvious commit-
ment to engage science realistically ("Our
task as theologians is to relate to the natural
sciences as they actually exist...."").
Taking notice of which sciences
Pannenberg engages "as they actually exist,"
however, and to what extent he engages them,
one can see that soaring rhetoric masks a not-
so-subtle predisposition to refrain from dis-
turbing the anthropocentrism of the theologi-
cal tradition in which Pannenberg is working.
In other ways, to be sure, Pannenberg is
known for challenging traditional and hidden
agendas, as when he describes Karl Earth's
theology:
The most remarkable example of the
theological retreat from a discussion of
the scientil'ic description of nature...."*
Pannenberg's selective engagement with the
scientific tradition, however, subjects him to
an objection that parallels his own criticism
of Earth's decision:
|l|n principle a theological doctrine of
creation should not concern itself with
scientific descriptions and results.'''
Discussion of the physical sciences, coupled
with a one-sided handling of a few biological
Through use ofa caricature underdeter-
mined by the factual realities of the animals
he dismisses^ Pannenberg stands in the long
line of those who have chosen selectively
from available images ofnonhuman ani-
malSy in order to confirm a preexisting bias.
sciences, is not likely to disturb the hegemony
of humans. Yet a careful, extended engage-
ment with ethology and related disciplines will
reveal how impoverished theological work is
when it ignores "scientific descriptions and
results," as Earth advocated. In particular, the
developed fields of cetacean studies and pri-
matology, filled with patient observations re-
garding social, cognitive and other complexi-
ties of bottlenose dolphins, chimpanzees,
bonobos, orangutans, gorillas, and some other
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primates, suggest that dismissals of any and
all nonhuman animals are agenda-driven
rather than reality-responsive.
Because in the life sciences, as Kathleen
Gibson summarizes, "All of the human-ape
dichotomies so cherished by the anthropolo-
gists and psychologists of the early 1960s have
fallen,"""' theological work that attempts to
make claims about human complexities rela-
tive to those of other animals is at great risk
of peipetuating caricatures when it steers cleiU"
of a full engagement with evidence and per-
spectives that challenge human uniqueness in
areas of consciousness, emotion, social com-
plexity, intelligence, and communication.
Hence, when Pannenberg effectively ignores
the scientific evidence that would disturb his
inherited theological premises, his approach
becomes, de facto, not unlike Barth's dis-
missal of scientific findings. His claim that
theologians must "relate to the natural sci-
ences as they actually exist" ^' should not be
allowed to obscure the fact that only some sci-
ences and some evidence are informing his
analysis. Failure to engage bodies of work
and research that are directly relevant to the
theological claims being made subjects
Pannenberg's theological work to many
charges, not the least of which is that it is just
another overstated and ignorance-driven
claim.
Thus, even when Pannenberg mentions
specific work with specific nonhuman ani-
mals,^' his arguments ignore so much of the
available evidence that his conclusions, char-
acteristically framed as dismissive generali-
zations, are positively misleading. An ex-
ample occurs in Toward a Theology of Na-
ture, when Pannenberg is working with
Teilhard de Chardin's insights:
[T]he fact of consciousness, which,
according to our observalion, appears
clearly only among human beings
amidst the entire expanse of nature.'*'
This implicit dismissal of the existence of
complex cognitive and emotional abilities in
any nonhuman animal tlies in the face of avail-
able evidence.^ The evidence was such that
Donald Griffin, Harvard University's re-
spected cognitive ethologist, could, only a few
years after Pannenberg wrote, state flatly:
The question of self-awareness is one of
the very few areas of cognitive ethology
where we have some concrete experi-
mental evidence.^^
Pannenberg's broad dismissal, then, espe-
cially because it takes place in a milieu of dis-
covery and constant challenges to traditional
claims of human uniqueness, are also contrary
to the basic humility that science and religion
enjoin upon the human seeker. If one asks
questions, such as "How well is the entire
range of life known?" or "What do cetaceans
do underwater with their large brains and com-
plex communication and social systems?", the
answers are, respectively, "Not very well yet"
and "We don't know." So why opine about a
broad subject when the Western tradition has
been shown to be, on the whole, so out of
touch with and dismissive of realities outside
of the human species?
Pannenberg's engagement with "science"
is, thus, not led by a vigorous curiosity when
he works with the issue of nonhuman animals.
Refraining from any informed, detailed-ori-
ented exploration of the biological creatures
that he dismisses, he is badly in error on the
issue of some other mammals' cognitive and
existential complexities. In the end,
Pannenberg simply does not tarry long enough
with any real-world nonhuman animals to see
theological and ethical significance in their
realities.
There are, of course, lots of ironies in the
cursory approach he uses. The editor of this
work, Ted Peters, notes in his introduction,
Perhaps the most startling and dramatic
contribution of Woliliart Pannenberg to
recent theological discussion has been
the initiative he takes in posing
theological questions to natural
scientists."""
But one must again ask, which natural scien-
tists? The major questions one can pose to
Pannenberg's approach to science are, from
the vantage point of ethologists, cognitive
scientists, or comparative psychologists, ques-
tions about its incompleteness. And more, this
shortcoming calls into question this work's
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relevance to an informed and vibrant religion-
and-science dialogue.
In summary, Pannenberg's limited en-
gagement undercuts the value of his concep-
tualization and discourse, and ultimately his
theological work. The result, at least on the
subject of nonhuman animals, is a work gov-
erned by a sterile and anthropocentric agenda
that is, upon examination, in tension with
many of Pannenberg's announced themes.
That this all-too-obvious agenda is not chal-
lenged by his fellow participants in religion-
and-science discussions speaks volumes about
which of the sciences are deemed relevant to
theology and to the religion-and-science dia-
logue itself.
Gordon Kaufman
A similar attitude appears in Pannenberg's
contemporaries.^^ I shall focus on only a few
of the relevant texts, however. Consider some
features of A Global Ethic: The Declaration
ofthe Parliament ofthe World Religions, writ-
ten by Hans Kiing and Karl-Josef Kuschel.
In particular, consider how the concept and
word "animals" is used. There are but two
brief references to nonhuman animals,"*** and
these both appear with the word "plants." In
effect, nonhuman animals are given the same
status as plants in this document dominated
by human-centered interests.^'*
To avoid the conclusion that the Western
theological tradition as a whole, or, similarly,
that the religion-and-science dialogue gener-
ally, is characterized by the patterns appear-
ing in the cited works of Pannenberg,
Moltmann, and Kiing, one could argue that
these three giants of modern theology are rep-
resentative of only a limited part of that tradi-
tion, say, the Gemian or European tradition
of anthropocentric theological reflection. But
I want to suggest that the habits of mind ex-
emplified by them are pervasive in the West-
ern theological tradition, as well as in the re-
ligion-and-science dialogue generally. I will
do this with examples from the altogether
cosmopolitan theologian Gordon Kaufman
and his book, //; Face of Mystery: A Con-
structive Theology { 1993).
Kaufman's well-respected work is, from
the beginning, dominated by a trilogy of con-
cepts that might best be summarized by this
plirase, "God, humanity, and the world." ^" For
example, in his opening chapter, "The Ques-
tion of God," Kaufman repeated writes of
three general categories: God, the human, and
all else, referred to by temis such as "the natu-
ral order," "the vast universe," and "the world
in which we live." ''
This trio of categories is, of course, com-
mon in the academy, prevailing especially in
the many subdisciplines of religious studies.
It is also characteristic of the discourse of poli-
tics and many other institutions. Consequently,
given its traditional nature and widespread
occurrence, its dominance may not appear at
first to be problematic in any way. Challenges
to it might seem, for many, the work of eccen-
trics. But some of the very insights that
Kaufman himself advances can be used to
problematize the trilogy, especially with regard
to its underlying generalizations and the ways
in which it operates as a covert dualism, that
is, as a theo-anthropocentric fonn dismissal of
anything beyond the human realm.
First of all, the concept of God is, as
Kaufman and so many other theologians have
creatively suggested, not a simple concept.
Secondly, in the same way that Kaufman notes
that claims about God are problematic and
conditioned, he also observes that claims
about "human nature" are notoriously plagued
by the same problems."
Thirdly—and most pertinent to the specific
argument being made here
—
generalizations
made about "nature" or "the world" are, like
the notions of God that Kaufman openly chal-
lenges, so coarse as to be woefully inadequate
to describing the complex realities they seek
to encompass. The realm of nonhuman ani-
mals is so internally diverse that to resort con-
tinually to the unqualified categories "nature"
or "the world" to describe the many realities
and activities of nonhuman animals is posi-
tively misleading for any number of reasons.
Of relevance to this argument is the fact that
the use of "animals" to designate all nonhu-
man animals is, ethically speaking, particularly
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problematic. The use of such wooden catego-
ries obscures realities widely recognized out-
side the Western theological traditit)n as hav-
ing major ethical significance. For example,
in the Indian traditions, the especially com-
plex features of elephants' lives, such as their
learning ability and their deep loyalty to their
family units (owing to their large brains and
capacity for complex emotions) have caused
them to be singled out i|
as animals that are rec-
ognizably more compli-
cated than most other ;
living beings."
One of the conse-
quences of constantly
assuming that this tril-
ogy operates well as a
meaningful description
of the essential elements
of our experience is that
the components of the
third category are, sub-
tly and sometimes not so
subtly, equated to one another. While human
beings are foregrounded in the trilogy, as is
God, the complexity of the remainder of this
world, though surely recognized, is obscured
in some crucial ways. Beyond the fact that
plants, econiches, and entire ecosystems (each
of which may command an ethical response)
are in the "nature" category, consider who and
what are contained in the subgroup of "ani-
mals": dolphins and whales, with the largest
brains on Earth, exist alongside insects; great
apes, sharing 98.4% of their genetic material
with human beings, walk alongside slugs, but
not with human beings; elephants stand next
to creatures so small they cannot be seen with-
out magnification.
With such a potent blurring of extra-hu-
man realities, important and ethically signifi-
cant realities clearly recognized in other ma-
jor ethical traditions are inevitably obscured.
For example, the unique complexities, prob-
lems, and challenges of ecological thinking can
easily be equated with the altogether distinct
issues arising out of the human relationship to,
and relations with, nonhuman animals. Thus,
even if nuanced uses of the trilogy do in some
instances lead to insights and help in counter-
ing the astonishing ethical anthropocentrism
of the Western intellectual tradition, in many
other instances clumsy use of the trilogy clearly
affirms the anthropocentric theological heri-
tage, including its meta-message that there are
no major entities in "the world" that compete
for the centrality given to human beings. In
short, terms like "the world" or "nature" fall
The fields of cetacean studies and primatol-
ogyy filled with patient observations regard-
ing social, cognitive and other complexities
of bottlenose dolphins^ chimpanzees,
bonoboSy orangutans, gorillas, and some
other primates, suggest that dismissals of
any and all nonhuman animals are agenda-
driven rather than reality-responsive.
far short of doing adequate work when they
attempt to name, encompass, and account for
the many different kinds of lives, ecosystems,
and other realities outside the human sphere.
A further consequence of the trilogy be-
ing a principal conceptual map is that, like the
discourse and theologically-dictated focus of
Pannenberg. this map seems to have little room
for the sciences that focus on nonhuman ani-
mals, or what Kaufman refers to as the "lower
animals." ''^ Kaufman in the end, though riv-
eted by the existing religion-and-science dia-
logue, spends no time at all on sciences that
carefully engage nonhuman animals.
Consider the underlying conceptual point
that Kaufman, a profoundly interesting
scholar of the theological tradition, makes
when summarizing "Troeltsch's critical analy-
sis of the concept of 'essence of Christianity'
itself":
[HJis massive historical work [showed]
that Christian faith, as presented by
most modern theologians, was in fact
largely a configuration of modern
western liberal values. Troeltsch
showed that the belief that there is some
historically demonstrable 'essence of
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Chrislianity' (as Schleiermacher,
Harnack, and others had supposed) was
simply false....'*'*
This same kind of deconstruction of an
image can be applied to the constructed char-
acter of the image of "the world" or "nature"
outside the human species. Contemporary
work by primatologists,'*^ as well as the anti-
essentializing critique of certain feminists and
post-modernists, suggests that the tendency to
lump all nonhuman realities into one group,
and then \o pretend to understand that group
as a single unit meaningfully contrasted with
"humanity" or "God," is a misguided enter-
prise. The nonhuman world is simply too busy,
diverse, and complex to be "essentialized," and
attempts to reduce all of the complex biologi-
cal realities outside humans to one category
say much more about the claimant's own lim-
ited perspective than about nonhuman life gen-
erally or the rich, interdependent web of indi-
viduals, communities, and processes some-
times refered to as "nature."
One example shows well how Kaufman's
treatment of all mmhuman animals parallels
Pannenberg's dismissal. When referring to
"forms of life less complex than Homo sapi-
ens,'" Kaufman uses the following reference
to dogs and cats as representative of nonhu-
man animals:
A hungry dog, for example, seeks
food.... A cat... is capable of stalking its
prey for hours. Many animals, thus,
have behavioral capacities similar to
what, in human beings, becomes
intention and attention. But there is a
very important dil't'crence: animals
pursue goals which have been set for
them directly by their organic needs and
instincts, that is, by nature (or perhaps,
in the case of domesticated animals, by
their trainers). Humans, however,
pursue (along with such "natural"
goals) artificial objectives, that is, goals
learned from their culture.... "
Kaufman then goes on to assert humans are free
to choose, while nonhuman animals are not.
In this respect humans are agents in a
way that other animals are not: they
can intend and attend deliberately, and
not only as a function of biological
need or impulse.^^
This statement is, first of all, inaccurate
factually. There are some complex animals,
for example, the nonhuman great apes,"*^ that
do "intend and attend deliberately." Further-
more, Kaufman's use of familiar domestic
animals, dogs and cats, loads the case dramati-
cally against nonhuman animals generally.
Domestic animals can be domesticated pre-
cisely because they have social instincts that
allow them to be subordinated to their human
companions."" Animals that are subordinate
to human beings, though important in their
own right, hardly represent the many animals
that cannot be subordinated. Nor do cats and
dogs, relatively less complex mammals, rep-
resent well the startlingly rich cognitive abili-
ties of, say, the larger-brained primates, ceta-
ceans, and elephants.
Note as well that Kaufman, perhaps as
wide-ranging a theologian as there is, remains
extremely narrow when discussing nonhuman
animals.
All forms of animal life—and particu-
larly the higher forms—have some sort
of "subjectivity" or "awareness."
...However, although the animal has
such feelings, it is not conscious of
them as feelings; nor is it conscious of
their appropriateness (or inappropriate-
ness) to certain objects in the environ-
ment or of the connection with its
behavior. This more complex sort of
awareness, which I am here calling
'consciousness," emerges only for the
linguistic animal—the human person
—
who is able to objectify for herself or
himself these 'inner states' by means of
words which name them.'''
As noted above, by 1993, when this work
was published, there were many accredited
scientific studies that confirmed that individu-
als in a number of other species (including at
least bottlenose dolphins, orangutans, bonobos,
and chimpanzees) had not only consciousness
and complex sorts of awareness, but self-
awareness and the ability to comprehend and
use various features of human language.
What is even more relevant is the tenor of
Kaufman's comments about the tentativeness
of scientific knowledge, which he emphasizes
is also a problem with knowledge of the di-
vine. Tentativeness also dominates claims
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about many nonhuman animals, above all the
more complex social animals. Of equal rel-
evance is the likelihood that "our story" about
"them" is likely to continue to change at a
rapid pace. Many nonhuman animals simply
have not been studied carefully, a by-product
of the crass over-generalizations that West-
ern intellectual, ethical and theological tradi-
tions, and now indirectly Kaufman in his turn,
have used to describe and thereby effectively
obscure the varied realities and possibilities
of nonhuman animals. Consider, then, how
fully relevant Kaufman's insights regarding
images of God might be to the impoverished
images of nonhuman animals, images that
Terms like ^^the world^^ or ^'nature^^fall
far short of doing adequate work when
they attempt to name, encompass, and
accountfor the many different kinds of
lives, ecosystems, and other realities out
side the human sphere.
continue to dominate industrialized societies,
mainline religious institutions, and the reli-
gion-and-science discussions.''-
As Kaufman suggests regarding images
of the divine, I suggest that the constructed,
self-serving features of cultural and theologi-
cal imagery of other animals need to be un-
packed. Such archeology on our own views,
using Kaufman's emphases on imaginative
construction, mystery, humility, and serendip-
ity, could, if applied to the complexities of
nonhuman animals, provide much food for
theological thouuht."
man. There is, however, much in this science-
intensive work that implicitly suggests the tril-
ogy will be radically inadequate for tasks cen-
tral to religious inquiries, the scientific enter-
prise, and, hence, the religion-and-science dia-
logue. For example, echoing Aristotle's famous
claim that humans by nature desire to know,^
Peacocke titles his Chapter 2, "What's There?"
If, as Peacocke suggests, human beings natu-
rally ask this question, human inquiries should
be, in many places and many cultures, rather
wide in their range. These inquiries would, in
such a case, lead to rich traditions of seeking
out the actual realities of, among other things,
a wide array of nonhuman animals.
History, unfortu-
I nately, does not suggest
that this has been the case.
The Buddhist tradition,
for example, "on the
whole... shows little in-
terest in questions of natu-
ral science."*''* In the
Western intellectual tradi-
tion, for prolonged peri-
i odsof time, human learn-
> ing traditions, despite
Aristotle's elegant claim
about human curiosity, were mired in the auc-
tores tradition of passing along inherited in-
formation regarding nonhuman animals,
rather than seeking out confinnation in nearby
empirical realities.^''
Peacocke himself seeks to engage biologi-
cal sciences extensively." Of the intellectu-
ally influential debate over sociobiology,
Peacocke writes,
Arthur Peacocke
The same divine/human/world trilogy
dominates the work of Arthur Peacocke, one
of the major scientists participating in the re-
ligion-and-science dialogue. The trilogy is,
for example, announced in the subtitle of his
important Theology for a Scientific Age: Be-
ing and Becoming—Natural, Divine and Hii-
Clearly this whole development is of
theological concern. For. by thus
encompassing in one theory human
culture and the non-human biological
world (especially in its genetic
aspects), sociobiology must inevitably
influence our thinking about what
human beings are.'''*
Peacocke recognizes that an engagement with
science has crucially important limits, since
worshipping the god called Science, so to
speak, is just as idolatrous as worshipping
other false idols.
130 The Journal of Faith and Science Exchange, 2000
The tendency to imperiousness in our
intellectual and cultural life has been
dubbed 'scientism'—the attitude that
the only kind of reliable knowledge is
that provided by science, coupled with
a conviction that all our personal and
social problems are 'soluble' by enough
science. ^'^
But even if a fascination with science has
its limits and risks, Peacocke clearly privileges
much scientific discourse. When he talks of
biology,^" for example, Peacocke emphasizes
the need to work creatively with standard bib-
iically-based views, such as the claim that death
is a consequence of human acts. Because of
this emphasis on getting beyond traditional for-
mulations and their debilitating and mislead-
ing tendency to anthropocentrism, one might
expect Peacocke to be free of any form of un-
scientific anthropocentrism. But the central role
of the same trilogy one finds in Kaufman, es-
pecially in light of its obscuring of nonhuman
animals, suggests that Peacocke 's analysis is
still dominated by the pre-scientific ethical
anthropocentrism that has dominated the Chris-
tian tradition out of which Peacocke comes.
This exclusivism, so often ignorance-driven, is
simply inadequate for the ethical tasks that are
at the center of any soteriological tradition.
Further, it is arguably contrary to the open-
minded spirit of the scientific enteiprise. It can
hardly, then, be the basis of a healthy, open,
and humility-driven religion-and-science dia-
logue.
Ian Barbour
Ian Barbour's lucid and synthetic corpus
dealing with religion and science, a good ex-
ample of which is Religion and Science,^^ re-
flects similar language and mental habits re-
garding nonhuman animals. In that the sci-
entific tradition's recognition of human kin-
ship with nonhuman animals is fully honored
by Barbour, this work exemplifies the need
for informed engagement. But because the
discourse reflects the peculiar tradition of
treating all nonhuman life as a single sphere
which is radically separate from humankind
in crucial theological and ethical ways, a du-
alism is inadvertently advanced.^' What
makes the dualism most noticeable is that
Barbour himself' discusses the shortcomings
of dualistic thinking, even as he uses the in-
extricably dualistic conceptuality, "humans
and animals." Barbour offers an impoilant
historical lesson: "every group tends to
absolutize itself. ..." ^^ This observation is
eminently applicable to the well-known hu-
man phenomenon of the marginalization of
one or more individuals by the action of a
group, but it is equally relevant to some soci-
eties' and religious tradifions" marginalization
of all nonhuman life.
John Polkinghorne
Before concluding with John
Polkinghorne's recent and valuable introduc-
tion to general issues in the religion-and-sci-
ence dialogue. Science and Theology: An In-
frodiiction, it must be noted that it does not,
as a logical and psychological matter, follow
that an emphasis on the humilities of religion
or science, or even talking of humans as within
the animal sphere, would eliminate the pro-
priety of references to human dignity or a
uniquely huinan place in the world. But these
humilities do suggest that it is not accurate to
talk of all other animals "leading up" to hu-
mans. In fact, such a framing of our relation-
ship to other living animals is not at all Dar-
winian (a revolution that Polkinghorne says
is to be reckoned with). Chimpanzees are, like
human beings, a current end-point of the evo-
lutionary process, not a "lower" form from
which human beings evolved. Like other life
fomis, people and chimpanzees are co-com-
panions at today's stage of evolutionary de-
velopment, as are all other living beings.
Human beings did not evolve from any of
them; they evolved, along with chimpanzees,
from a common ancestor. In one sense, both
species are equally "evolved."
Polkinghorne suggests that science, like
so much of religion, counsels a fundamental
humility when searching the world. A com-
mitment to non-arrogance, as it were, creates
oppoHunities for both openness and inclusive-
ness. It can be supported, at least psycho-
logically, by the all-too-frequent revelation
that in the past many claims of "knowledge"
have proven wrong. ^^
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What is of concern in this work by a lead-
ing participant in the reUgion-and-science
dialogue is the scientifically inaccurate claim
that humans alone possess self-conscious-
ness." This is an odd assertion, given both
the available evidence when this text was
written and what Polkinghome himself says
about the nature of science. For many rea-
sons, science is, according to Polkinghorne,
dogged by uncertain-
ties, and thus must be
practiced with a cer-
tain humility.
Polkinghorne's own
claim about humans
alone possessing self-
consciousness violates
a number of basic sci-
entific canons, not the
least of which is that
an absence of evi-
dence hardly equates
are far less infomied about and less sympa-
thetic to either science generally or nonhu-
man animals. Examples include works within
liberation theology" and liberal theology.
Even the work of Andrew Linzey, the fore-
most advocate of the obligation of theology
to concern itself with nonhuman animals, fails
to engage contemporary science or the rel-
evance of empirical investigation generally.^*
As Kaufman suggests regarding images of the
divine, I suggest that the constructed^ self-
serving features of cultural and theological
images of other animals need to be unpacked.
Such archeology on our own views, using
Kaufman 's emphases on imaginative construc-
tion, mystery, humility, and serendipity, could
provide much foodfor theological thought.
to evidence of ab-
sence. It also violates
the spirit of his observations about the many
reasons supporting the need for humility. He
explicitly cites the clouding up of our vision
by the extraordinary complexity of what is
going on in the natural world, the fact that
sciences are not particularly adept at judg-
ments regarding what happens everywhere
and at all times, the long history of radical
revisions in various sciences across time, and
the fact that science is practiced in commu-
nities dominated by "ways of thinking which
are all the more influential for being tacit
rather than explicit." ^^
All of this applies fully to what the West-
em intellectual and scientific traditions have
claimed about human beings relative to non-
human animals (as noted above). Humility,
whether theologically or scientifically driven,
suggests that participants in the religion-and-
science dialogue ought to be, at the very least,
conservative on dismissing nonhuman ani-
mals' complexities.
Two qualifications
There are, to be sure, many other works
within the Western theological tradition that
Another important qualification is that
there are important exceptions in the religion-
and-science dialogue to the general trend to
ignore nonhuman animals. A very bright spot,
for example, is the work of Thomas Berry.
This "geologian" is very comfortable with
explicit inclusion of nonhuman animals within
ethical boundaries, a feature of his work that
may be a result of the fact that he studied non-
Abrahamic traditions extensively early in his
career.^'' Another example of inclusion is the
work of Brian Swimme.**"
Science and which community?
I have suggested above that the term 'sci-
ence' misleads if it is employed in ways that
suggest that the scientific tradition is univo-
cal, dominated by a single method, or value-
free. Because science is diverse, the scien-
tific tradition has, regarding nonhuman ani-
mals, diverse resources upon which one can
draw when participating in any religion-and-
science dialogue. Of further relevance to the
possibilities of the religion-and-science dia-
logue is the fact that some scientific experi-
mentation, especially as it is practiced today,
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is complicit in the modern academy's and in-
dustrialized societies' dismissal ofnonhuman
animals. The use ofnonhuman animals in bio-
medical experiments, as sources of replace-
ment body parts for human transplantation,
and in industrial testing of non-essential con-
sumer goods is rampant. This results, socio-
logically at least, in scientific institutions hav-
ing a vested interest in nonhuman experimen-
tal subjects being denied the kinds of moral
rights and protections that would prohibit
them from being used as scientific tools.
While such denials may have the approval
of some religious institutions,*" the phenom-
enon as a whole is driven by secular realities
and values. Hence, one of the reasons that
the modern religion-and-science discussion
has not addressed the significance of other ani-
mals is science-driven and not directly related
to the Western theological tradition's short-
comings regarding nonhuman animals. Sim-
ply said, scientists and scientific establish-
ments have, for their own reasons, often ig-
nored nonhuman animals as subjects worthy
of ethical concern.
An examination of scientific practices
suggests that there is an implicit moral com-
munity within any modern scientific circle.
As a practical matter, it has been human be-
ings alone who have been identified as the
living beings deemed moral patients and thus
entitled to protections.**- Thus, the "commu-
nity" so honored by many scientists is often
extremely narrow, and the assumptions, gen-
erally speaking, have not been challenged by
the mainline theological traditions of the
Abrahamic religion.
A fascinating, even if dismaying, chapter
of our intellectual history, and certainly one
relevant to the likely content of any religion-
and-science dialogue that goes forward in
Western intellectual circles, is that both sci-
entific and religious groups speak similarly
regarding humans and other animals. Note
the functional equivalence, as well as the vo-
cabulary similarity, between ( 1 ) the follow-
ing scientists' comments and (2) the comment
on animals in the 1994 Roman Catholic Cat-
echism. The catechism reads as follows:
Animals, like plants and inanimate
things, are by nature destined for the
common good of past, present and
future humanity.**^
Peter Gerone, a biomedical scientist who di-
rects the Tulane Regional Primate Research
Center, was asked several years ago why he
supports the view that human beings are ex-
empted from experiments, while all other ani-
mals are not. Gerone replied:
hi my own mind, it comes down to the
question of which do I want to help the
most, animals or people.'*^
Similarly, the respected brain research scien-
tist Stuart Zola-Morgan justified his invasive,
harmful experiments on nonhuman primates
in this way:
I think a human life is more valuable
than an animal lifc.**'^
As noted above, the '"human and animal" di-
chotomy is eminently unscientific; it also is
as plagued by logical problems as would be
the phrase "people and Englishmen."
A broader view of religion and
science
In the complex, internally diverse spheres
of religion and science, there has been, his-
torically speaking, no single answer to the
question, "Who are members of our commu-
nity?" When one considers the wide range of
ecological visions found in the sciences and
the religious traditions, especially across time
and place, it becomes obvious that religious
believers have often included within the moral
"community" many living beings not cur-
rently so recognized in the institutionalized
practice of science today. Because some re-
ligious traditions readily include nonhuman
life, while others do not, the continuing
anthropocentrism of the religion-and-science
dialogue is baffling. Perhaps it can be ex-
plained as the result of the prevelance of a
one-sided inteipretation of the Abrahamic tra-
ditions. It is well documented, however, that
religious traditions have extraordinary re-
sources for other, nonanthropocentric views.
For example, in the Christian theological tra-
dition, there are vast resources in the sacra-
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mental and creation theologies for affirma-
tion of nonhuman realities,*^^ as well as tre-
mendous investments in praxis/ethical con-
cerns and development of human individu-
als' abilities for compassion and love. Hence,
in the Islamic, Jewish, and Christian tradi-
tions, one can easily find individuals who treat
nonhuman animals with great compassion. It
is also well known that in other religious tra-
ditions there are at least as many "conceptual
resources." **^ Included would be fewer du-
alistic divisions, more ethics-driven compas-
sion, and less emphasis on rationality as a
distinguishing characteristic.
Remaining questions
Questions might be asked about the ad-
equacy of conceptual approaches, such as the
divine/liuman/world trilogy mentioned above,
that are, I suggest, fundamentally ethical in
nature. As such, these questions will quite
naturally be a matter of the deepest concern
to religious traditions.
• Which religious traditions and
subtraditions should have a "voice" of rel-
evance in this matter? Which sciences?
• What is the relevance of the actual reali-
ties of nonhuman animals' lives?
• How does one recognize and deal with
the fact that the methods and choices of the
practitioners of various individual sciences
promote, on the issue of the extent of com-
munity, one religious view over other religious
views?
• Should religious traditions work to cor-
rect imbalances and biases for antliiopocen-
tric views that have, historically, dominated
science as practiced?
Conclusion
Although the theme of the importance of
nonhuman individuals is not a new theme,
there is a profound failure to deal with this
subject in the current religion-and-science
dialogue. A principal cause of this failure is a
continuing anthropocentrism in mainline or
traditional ethical retlection, which is often
assumed to be the whole of ethical reflection
rather than merely one of the many histori-
cally and culturally conditioned options avail-
able. The continued failure of dialogue par-
ticipants to address creatively the findings of
the sciences that study nonhuman animals
threatens to perpetuate the exclusivist values
that now dominate the dialogue. The same
anthropocentrism, in its ecological forms, has
imbalanced many people's way of living and
thinking in the modem, industrialized world.
Additionally, the approach to nonhuman ani-
mals presently dominating the religion-and-
science dialogue is imperialist, in the sense
that it continues the long tradition of obscur-
ing alternative views found in the lifeways of
the people whose worlds, lives, cultures, and
minds were colonized, catechized, and de-
stroyed by the missionaries of European cul-
ture.
The manner in which a range of alterna-
tives to traditional ethical anthropocentrism
can promote truer, richer community is rel-
evant to how religious believers and theolo-
gians can engage the sciences generally and,
more specifically, those sciences dealing with
nonhuman animals. Foregrounding the ex-
plicit and implicit features of the exclusivist
recognition of humans as the only biological
beings deserving of fundamental ethical pro-
tections can help participants in the religion-
and-science dialogue see fundiunental features
of which religions, which sciences, and which
communities they have been engaging, as well
as those they can engage in the future. It can
also help them be more responsive to the
shortcomings of anthropocentric ethics found
so broadly in contemporary discussions re-
garding religious, scientific, and secular sto-
ries of the universe. A continuing failure to
challenge the prevailing tendency to ethical
anthropocentrism will lead to a progressive
impoverishment of the religion-and-science
dialogue and a perpetuation of the exclusivist
values that now imbalance human life and
thought. The.se consequences, I submit, will
be contrary to, and counteiproductive for, the
most basic values of any religion or science.
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Endnotes:
1
.
See, for example, Politics I, 5, 1 254b2()-
21.
2. Consider, for example, the support given
by John Locke, who otherwise advanced the
cause of natural rights, for slavery under the
constitution of South Carolina. See Hood, pp.
147 and 188.
3. There is rich, scholarly work on racism
in the western tradition; see Hood, for ex-
ample. The patriarchy materials are pro-
foundly developed and plentiful. On classism,
see the insightful work of Gorringe. On ho-
mophobia in some portions of the Christian
tradition, see Bawer and Bruce.
4. These three terms are in quotes because
the subject matter each raises is, upon exami-
nation, extremely complex. There iire many
theological traditions, and they are extraordi-
narily diverse. The comments in this article
are directed toward what may generally be
called the mainline Christian theological tra-
dition. Science, too, is far from monolithic; it
is, rather, an ever growing forest of sciences
and subdisciplines. The word "animals" is,
in ordinary discourse, used primarily to mean
"all animals other than human beings," be-
cause even though human beings are known
to be animals, daily discourse is allowed to
work as if they are radically distinct from other
animals. Although the phrase "humans and
animals" is pervasive and influential, I inten-
tionally avoid this unscientific and illogical
practice for the agenda-driven purpose of sug-
gesting that the biological community can be
thought of holistically and without harsh, tra-
dition-driven dualisms.
5. See, respectively, Monod, and Dawkins.
Of the theologians and scientists mentioned
in this article, Kaufman, Peacocke,
Polkinghorne, and Barbour mention Monod
and Dawkins in the works discussed here.
6. I first heard this term used by Peter
Singer, now of Princeton University, in an
August 1994 meeting at The Hague.
7. A foregrounding of ethical concerns is
so typical of religious traditions that the
comparativist Ninian Smart, when creating
categories for approaching religious traditions,
includes the category "ethical" as one of the
six principal dimensions of religious tradi-
tions. See Smart, for example. The other cat-
egories are ritual, mythology, doctrine, and the
social and experiential dimensions of life.
8. Catechism ofthe Catholic Church, § 2415.
9. The most debated statement along these
lines is White's essay, "The Historic Roots of
Our Ecologic Crisis." White argues that the
Christian tradition's anthropocentrism was a
principal factor in the origin and support of
instrumental attitudes toward nature as a
whole. While White's analysis has been force-
fully challenged in many different ways as to
its accuracy, on the distinct issue of the West-
ern tradition's ethical anthropocentrism rela-
tive to nonhuman animals, the thrust of his
thesis remains largely unrebutted. Similar
points regarding the orientation of various re-
ligious traditions to ethical issues involving
nonhuman animals are made in my reviews
of Subverting Hatred: The Challenge ofNon-
violence in Religious Traditions. See "On
Breadth and Exclusion in Concepts of Non-
violence," "The Question of Nonviolence in
Hinduism and Other Traditions," and "On
Peace and the Extent of Community."
10. An argument for the "natural" qualities
of such questions can be found in Wilson.
1 1
.
The classic argument for the expanded
circle thesis is Lecky. See also Singer.
12. See Waldau, "Will the Heavens Fall?"
13. The most complete set of discussions
in this area is, without doubt, the "Religion
and Ecology" series at Hai^vard University's
Center for the Study of World Religions di-
rected, by Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim
from 1997-1999.
14. See, for example, Waldau, "Beyond
Praise of the 'Declaration of the Parliament
of World Religions.'"
15. There is also virtually no engagement
with the ancient, non-scientific traditions that
have much to offer about specific nonhuman
animals.
16. Quoted by John Passmore, p. 134.
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17. For an account, see Rollin, especially
pp. 67-75 and 97-106.
18. Consider that primatologists now rou-
tinely use the word '"culture" for chimpanzee
learning traditions. See, for example,
Wrangham et al.
19. What, for example, is the actual impact
of captivity upon eminently social animals like
gorillas, dolphins, or elephants? Is this some-
thing a moral agent should care about? Would
exposure to elephant individuals in their fam-
ilies suggest more than would intimate famil-
iarity with all that has been said about el-
ephants in, say, European, or Asian or Afri-
can, languages?
20. Diamond.
2 1 . 1 am indebted to John Hick for this quo-
tation, cited in Chatterjee, p. 73. The original
quotatation is from Desai, pp. 111-12.
22. Note that the claim here is that the
Abrahamic traditions are ethically anthropo-
centric. Some claim that these traditions are
theocentric. Whether or not one subscribes
to this term as helpful, the fact remains that
in ethical matters, most of those who claim
that theocentrism is a valuable concept remain
overwhelmingly anthropocentric when an-
swering the question "Who are the others?"
(That is, human beings are the animals who
get the most fundamental protections when
human interests are at stake.) One notewor-
thy exception is the work of Andrew Linzey.
See, for example. Animal Theology.
23. There are important qualifications, since
domestication of animals was, and still is,
widely practiced in a way that involves ex-
tremely harsh realities. For example, regard-
ing elephants, see Waldau, "Buddhism and
Animals Rights." Generally, however, the
injunction not to kill is very inclusivist.
24. One risk to foreground here is what
philosophers like to call "the naturalistic fal-
lacy." This occurs when, solely on the basis
of some fact, someone contends that moral
agents ought to do so and so. But here that
problem is avoided, since I have assumed
something beyond the mere fact of these
complex nonhunian animals' existence. I
have also assumed that human beings have
the profoundly important ability to care
about, recognize as distinct individuals, and
then interact with these other, nonhuman
animals as beneficiaries or moral equals
—
that is, as individuals deserving the basic
moral protections human beings offer to
those they consider within their "moral
circle." So, the question becomes this: If
human beings are both ( 1 ) moral agents and
(2) capable of caring about these other ani-
mals (that is, they include them in their moral
circle), ought they to do so?
23. 1 refer here to the well-known fact that
many indigenous peoples lived in respectful
relation to the nonhuman animals in their
econiche. For a contemporary example of eth-
ics-driven reasoning in favor of human car-
ing about some nonhuman animals, see
Cavalieri and Singer. Note also that caring
about some nonhuman animals cannot auto-
matically be equated with knowing and car-
ing about each and every living being, as the
latter is not feasible given that human beings
are not able to recognize some nonhuman or-
ganisms as individuals.
26. Pannenberg. Anthropology, p. 61.
27. Ibid., p.62, n. 54.
28. Ibid., pp. 352-53.
29. The respected classicist Richard Sorabji,
in Animals Minds and Human Morals, de-
scribes the vibrant debate among classical
Greeks and Greco-Roman thinkers. He ar-
gues that Augustine effectively shut down the
debate by siding with the Stoics in their de-
nial of nonhuman animals" cognitive abilities
and, thus, their moral significance.
30. Regarding values that appear during
scientific work, there is the important dis-
tinction between ( 1 ) science being driven by
various avoidable agendas, and (2) all sci-
ence inevitably having unavoidably value-
and theory-laden features (for a detailed dis-
cussion of the latter, see Barbour, pp. 106-
1 10). Both features are the subject of a sub-
stantial body of work, including sophisti-
cated critiques from, among others, femi-
nists, animal rights advocates, and environ-
mentalists.
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.
It was discovered in the mid- 1 980s that
human beings and chimpanzees are extraor-
dinarily similar in terms of genetic material.
This was first reported by Sibley and Ahlquist.
The figures usually given are 98.4% for hu-
man/chimpanzee similarity, and 97.7% for
human/gorilla similarity. Subsequent work
has suggested that the similarity in the active
parts of the genetic coding mechanism is over
99%.
32. Pannenberg, op. cit., p. 32.
33. See, for example, Goodall, In the
Shadow ofMan; The Chimpanzees ofGombe;
and Through a Window. A good sampling of
contemporary literature can be found in a re-
cent work calling for the extension of legal
rights to two nonhuman great ape species
(bonobos and chimpanzees); see Wise.
34. See Gallup, for example.
35. A good summary appears in Payne, ch.
4.
36. Reported in, respectively, Payne,
Langbauer and Thomas; Marten and PsiUiikos;
and Parker, Mitchell, and Boccia.
37. Pannemberg, Toward a Theology of
Nature, p. 49.
38. Ibid., p. 32.
39. This is Pannenberg's description in To-
ward a Theoh?gy ofNature, p. 50.
40. Gibson, p. 97.
41. Pannenberg, op cit., p. 49.
42. Ibid., for example, pp. 45-49, where
Pannenberg shows familiarity with some evo-
lutionary thinking; or in AnthropoUygy (see,
for example, pages 142-3 and 354-6), where
he addresses various features of the ethology
work of Konrad Lorenz.
43. Ibid., p. 139.
44. At the time Pannenberg included this
claim in his 1993 work, there was extraordi-
narily detailed information available regard-
ing consciousness, self-consciousness, and
self-awareness in some nonhuman animals.
See, for example, Griffin's books, The Ques-
tion ofAnimal Awareness, und Animal Minds.
45. Griffin, Animal Minds, p. 249, and gen-
erally, pp. 245-252; see also Byrne.
46. Peters, p. 1.
47. For example, a similar analysis could
be made of JUrgen Moltmann's work, such as
his 1 984-5 Gifford Lectures, God in Creation.
Hans Kiing's many works also retlect this
same set of problems. See, for example. On
Being A Christian, trans, by Edward Quinn
(New York: Doubleday), 1974; Does God
Exist? An Answer for Today, trans, by Ed-
ward Quinn (New York: Vintage), 1981;
Christianity and the World Religions: Paths
of Dialogue with Islam, Hinduism, and Bud-
dhism, trans, by Peter Heinegg (London:
Doubleday), 1986.
48. Kung and Kuschel, pp. 101, 107.
49. See Waldau, "Beyond Praise."
50. Kaufman, /// the Face ofMystery, p. 19.
51. Ibid., p. 12.
52. Darwin remarked that he had collected
over twenty claims regarding uniqueness of
humans, "but they are almost worthless, as
their wide difference and number prove the
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of the at-
tempt." Quoted in Radner and Radner, p. 8.
Gorringe makes very interesting comments on
the ways in which elitist groups have used the
notions of human nature and natural law to
advance their own agendas.
53. See Waldau, "Buddhism and Animals
Rights."
54. Regarding Kaufman's thoughts on hu-
man continuity with the "lower animals," see
pp. 146, 163f, 203,23()f.
55.1bid.,p. 24, note9.
56. Summarized well in Wise.
57. Kaufman, op. cit., p. 146.
58. Ibid.
59. See Byrne, passim, especially pp. 124-
44. Both anecdotal and systematic evidence
is available in Pouts; Savage-Rumbaugh and
Lewin; and Cavalieri and Singer.
60. Clutton-Brock, and Seipell
61. Kaufman, op. cit., pp. 163-64.
62. Kaufman's book, God, Mystery, Diver-
sity, provides another insight into risks taken
when using the God/liumankind/world trilogy.
The diversity and pluralism on which
140 The Journal of Faith and Science Exchangey 2000
Kaufman focuses is entirely human. Yet these
very concepts, and especially the intuitions
and critiques advanced by interfaith dialogue
regarding the shortcomings of exclusivist ten-
dencies, translate readily into insights about
the exclusion of nonhuman realities. Further,
how inclusivist can interfaith dialogue be if it
excludes the nonhuman world so richly rec-
ognized outside the Abrahamic traditions?
63. The most developed theological think-
ing regarding nonhuman animals is that of
Andrew Linzey, best exemplified in Animal
Theology.
64. Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 980a22.
65. Schmithausen, p. 95.
66. For information as to how aitctores (lit-
erally, "originators") in the Hellenistic world,
and then later, passed along inherited views,
rather than a commitment to empirical inves-
tigation, as the criterion regarding nonhuman
animals, see Bestiaiy, pp. 7-8.
67. See, for example, the detailed chart in
Peacocke, pp. 216-17, and the heavy empha-
sis on cognitive sciences on pp. 223-36.
68. Ibid., pp. 226-27.
69. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
70. Ibid., pp. 221-22.
71. This distinguished scholar has a very
interesting set of vocabularies for this topic.
While he uses the word "animar' in ways that
acknowledge that human beings are animals
(for example, Barbour, p. 58), the overwhelm-
ing tendency is to use the term as a reference
to all nonhuman animals (as at pp. 58, 59, 60,
74, 254-5, 259, 270, 278, and 280). A similar
discourse habit appears (at p. 60, for example)
when primates are discussed: "between hu-
mans and the highest apes." What makes this
odd is that human beings are, scientifically
speaking, members of the ape family. At p.
74, when Barbour talks of the "the similari-
ties between humans and animals," he seems
fully comfortable with this artificial division
as if it was part of nature, or a helpful de-
scription because it is reflective of the order
of things.
72. Ibid., p. 259.
73. Ibid., p. 270.
74. William Paley noted at the end of the
eighteenth century, "Nothing is so soon made
as a maxim; and it appears from the example
of Aristotle, that authority and convenience,
education, prejudice, and general practice,
have no small share in the making of them;
and that the laws of custom are very apt to be
mistaken for the order of nature." (Paley, p.
32.) Paley was discussing Aristotle's view of
non-Greeks as slaves.
75. Polkinghorne, p. 49.
76. Ibid., pp. 9ff.
77. See, for example, Linzey's analysis
(chapter 4) of liberation theology's shortcom-
ings regarding nonhuman animals.
78. See, for example, Waldau, "Shortcom-
ings in Isolated Traditions of Ethical Dis-
course."
79. Berry, The Dream ofthe Earth, and The
Great Work.
80. See, for example, Swimme's The Hid-
den Heart. At p. 50, Swimme speculates, "If
an orangutan could speak, it too would regard
the stars as far above, up in the sky; if it were
lying on its back on a field of grass at night, it
too would think it was looking up at the stars."
The point here is not the accuracy of the state-
ments, but the willingness to get beyond the
standard dimissals of all nonhuman animals.
On the extraordinary intelligence and other
abilities of orangutans specifically, see
Galdikas, and Cavalieri and Singer. For more
on Swimme's thought, see The Universe is a
Green Dragon, and Swimme's joint effort
with Beny, The Universe Story. In the latter,
there are abundant references to many differ-
ent animals and plants, as well as references
to the more mentally complex nonhuman ani-
mals: at p. 144, the text mentions the gibbon,
chimpanzee, orangutan, gorilla; and at p. 272,
the timeline mentions many animals, includ-
ing whales, apes, cats, dogs.
8 1
.
Views from different religious traditions
are discussed in Regan.
82. As always, qualifications are important.
There have been, and continue to be, human
subjects in biomedical experiments. See
Lederer, for example. In addition, some non-
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human animals have been exempted from the
harshest features of experimental realities.
Britain and New Zealand have had, respec-
tively, administrative and legislative bans
since the late 199()s; while in the U.S., there
are less extensive limitations. See, for ex-
ample, National Research Council/ILAR
Committee on Long-temi Care of Chimpan-
zees.
83. Catechism, p. 516.
84. Quoted in Blum, p. 137.
85. Ibid., p. 78.
86. See, for example, Linzey; and Habgood,
pp. 47-52.
87. See, for example, Callicott and Ames,
pp. 17-21.
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